This article analyzes the quantitative (mechanical) effects and qualitative (perceptions) effects on political representation of the election of two separate chambers in Latin America's bicameral systems. After discussing the spread and strength of bicameralism in Latin America, we compare the different electoral systems for lower chambers and Senates. Our study shows that in a region characterized by relatively high levels of malapportionment in the first chamber, the second chamber reinforces the malapportionment in parliament.
groups. Alternatively, bicameralism may produce (negative) side effects, because the double option confers special benefits to some electors and generates disadvantages for others or even for the general electorate.
Democracy is in crisis in many Latin American countries (PNUD 2004; Valenzuela 2004) .
Citizens are discontented with the functioning of democracy and the performance of most of the political institutions. According to survey data, the institutions in which citizens place the least confidence are the legislatures and political parties (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2005) . As a result, the reform of political institutions is a recurring topic of academic and public debate (Payne et al. 2002) .
Does the diversification of representation in two chambers have an effect on the citizens' perception of the parliaments? In Latin America half of the democracies in the region have bicameral parliaments. But bicameralism is criticized in some countries, and in the 1990s in two cases (Peru, Venezuela) bicameral systems were abolished. If we look at the Latinobarómetro data -which is, we admit, a very crude indicator -, there is no great difference in the evaluation of unicameral and bicameral Parliaments (table 1) . On average bicameral parliaments are marginally more trusted than their unicameral alternative. 2 Two of the bicameral Parliaments receive the highest confidence values, whereas half of the bicameral parliaments are evaluated worse than the majority of the unicameral parliaments.
Prima facie, two chambers do not increase confidence in Parliament in a significant way. On balance, in many Latin American countries the citizens do not appreciate the advantages of double representation. Perhaps, they are dissatisfied with the way the Senates comply with their political functions, including the kind of political representation they offer.
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As far as we know, Chile is the only country where we can fall back on surveys differentiating between both houses of Parliament (CERC 2004: 7; Huneeus 2003: 212-213) . The time series show no difference with respect to the confidence in the Senate or the lower house/Senators or Deputies. This is a surprising result, because Chilean Senators display a high self-esteem. For many politicians the Senate is the final step in their political career. But, apparently citizens do not differentiate in the evaluation between both chambers. Conceivably, the non-elected Senators have a negative influence on the evaluation of the upper house. Source: Payne et al. (2002: 38) .
Some thirty years ago Maurizio Cotta (1974) developed a theoretical framework for the comparative analysis of bicameral systems. Within this structural-functional framework, he created two opposite sets of hypothetical propositions concerning the possible impact of a second chamber for the different functions a parliament should perform. If we take a look at the representative function, which forms the topic of our study, the alternative hypotheses presented by Cotta (1974: 219-221) In this article we analyze the anticipated effects and the side effects of the principles of political representation which bicameral systems in Latin America embody. In the first section, we discuss theoretical justifications of second chambers in bicameral systems, with special emphasis on the representation of different constituencies. We describe the spread of bicameralism and the electoral rules for the two chambers in Latin America. And we explore the strength and the different patterns of bicameralism in the region. Latin American Senates are strong and constitute a veto-player or veto-point in the political process. In the second section, we use a survey of 147 Senators in four South American countries to analyze their conceptions of representation and how they perceive their role. The self-perceptions of the South American senators indicate that the representation of diverse constituencies is an important difference between the two chambers. In the third section, we assess the impact of different electoral rules for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in Latin American bicameral systems on patterns of political representation in Congress. We explore the tension between different principles of representation. We take a special look at problems of malapportionment and disproportionality in bicameral systems. In the fourth section, we study the effects of gender quotas in bicameral systems. In general the electoral rules for the Latin American Senates do not favor the election of women to the Second Chambers. Therefore, gender quotas seem to have less influence on the representation of women in the second chamber. We conclude with some general reflections on electoral rules and their influence on representation patterns in Latin American bicameral systems.
Bicameralism and Representation in Latin American Parliaments
There are at least four basic justifications for the existence of a second chamber in bicameral systems. 3 First, second chambers contribute to the system of checks and balances, dispersing and balancing political power. Second, the consecutive treatment of legislation in two independent chambers improves the quality of legislation. Third, second chambers contribute to the stability in legislative outcomes because it is more difficult to change the status quo in a legislative system formed by two bodies. Fourth, the two chambers represent different political interests and constituencies. In general bicameral systems are endorsed with reference to a mix of vindications, and they can be defended with reference to only one of the different justifications. In this paper we will not prove if all the justifications, which have been brought forward, reflect the political reality in Latin America. Instead we will focus on the fourth justification for bicameral parliaments.
Historically, in Europe, the different chambers of parliament represented diverse classes or estates. Like the House of Lords in Great Britain, the upper chamber represented the interests of the aristocracy and the lower chamber represented the "common" people. Later in 3 Consult, for instance, Cotta (1974) , Riker (1992) , Schüttemeyer & Sturm (1992) ), Tsebelis & Money (1997) , Shell (1998) , Patterson & Mughan (1999) , Riescher, Ruß & Haas (2000) , Rogers (2001) until now, has been less studied in political science. In some countries like Australia (Thompson 1999) or Uruguay, the upper chamber or Senate aggregates the interests of the citizens on a national scale, and the first chamber represents the local interests of the citizens. In addition, the second chamber represents the electorate in a more balanced way and corrects distortions in representation of the lower house. 4 Latin American Senates reflect these different logics or principles of representation for the second chambers (table 3) .
Today, in Latin America nine of eighteen democracies are bicameral systems (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay).
These are strong bicameral systems, because the powers of the two chambers are symmetric (separation of power). And at the same time the rules determining their composition promote incongruence 5 . This can produce different interests or a separation of purpose (Shugart & Haggard 2001 ) among the members of both chambers.
Unlike European bicameral systems, with few exceptions 6 all members of the Latin Ameri- This is the case of the Australian Senate. "As a consequence of the 1948 proportional method of electing Senators, it does so in a fashion which more accurately reflects the state of electoral opinion in the nation. It corrects dysfunctions of the single member electoral system used for choosing the House of Representatives and thereby provides parliamentary representation for individuals and parties with significant voter support, which would be otherwise unrecognised in parliamentary terms except where such support is geographically concentrated" (Evans 2000: chapter 1.5).
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Arend Lijphart (1984 Lijphart ( , 1999 was the first to construct an index to measure the strength of bicameralism based on these two dimensions. Most other authors who explore the strength of bicameralism base their analysis on the original or a refined version of Lijpharts' model. See for example, Anastasia, Melo & Santos (2004) , Navarro (2004) , Schiavon (2004 ), Swenden (2004 . In the tradition of Lijphart in another study (Llanos & Nolte 2003) we constructed an analytical tool to evaluate the strength of bicameralism in Latin America. In the classic cases of federal systems -Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico -, where the Senate represents the states of the federation, all territorial units (states) elect the same number of representatives independently of the number of electors/inhabitants. In the unitary states of Bolivia, Chile and the Dominican Republic the same logic of equal territorial representation applies. 7 In the case of the Dominican Republic the national territory is divided in 30 districts, and each district elects one senator by plurality vote. In contrast to the afore mentioned countries, Senators are elected in a national list by proportional representation in Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay. In these countries, the Senate represents the interests of a national electorate, while the lower chamber represents local or regional interests. The Mexican Senate is elected by two different electoral systems (segmented electoral system): 32 senators are elected on a national list by proportional representation, 92 senators are elected in three member districts by plurality vote. As in Argentina and Bolivia two senators repre-7 In the Chilean case at first, each of the thirteen administrative units (regions) of the country should elect two senators without regard to the population of each region. Later the six most populous regions have been divided in two circumscriptions. However, there is still a great difference among the circumscriptions in the numbers of votes necessary to elect a senator. sent the strongest party, one senator the first minority. In Brazil, three senators represent each state. They are elected alternately -one or two -every four years by plurality vote. In Chile, the senators are elected by plurality in two member circumscriptions (binominal): one for the first and one for the second majority. The first majority obtains both seats only if it gets two times the percentage of votes of the second majority. Below (section 4), we will take a look on the side effects of different electoral systems for Latin American Senates on the representation of women in parliament.
The Representation of Different Constituencies in the Perception of the Senators
In Latin American bicameral systems there is great difference with regard to the districts that constitute the basis for the election of the two chambers (table 3) Uruguayan senators also perceived the different constituencies of both chambers as a major factor of differentiation, because they represent a national electorate and not a specific circumscription (departamento).
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Most of the survey data are published in Sánchez, Nolte & Llanos (2005) . For comparison of the perceptions of senators and deputies we also used data from the project "Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas" of the University of Salamanca. The open question to the Senators was: What, is your view, is the main difference between the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies?
Source: Based on survey data of the project "Senates in South American bicameral systems", Institute for IberoAmerican Studies, Hamburg. See statistical appendix in Sánchez, Nolte & Llanos (2005) .
In another set of questions, we presented several items related to the topic of representation (table 6) to the citizens of their province/state/region when they take political decisions. In Argentina and Chile we have comparative data for the Chamber of Deputies. If we take the category "much influence" the deputies in both countries perceive more pressure from their electorate than the senators. In Argentina and slightly less so in Brazil, the governors of the provinces as well have great influence on the Senators. In contrast, in Chile, the regional authori-ties have little or no influence on the political decisions of the Senators. They are not elected by popular vote, but rather designated by the president, and they have no independent political mandate. The senators of all three countries confer great importance to the activity of obtaining funds for their circumscription (table 7) . There is not much difference between the federal states, Argentina and Brazil, and the non-federal state (Chile). If there exists a conflict between the needs of the province/state/region and the party position the great majority of the Senators (and deputies) would vote for the interests of their electorate (table 8) . It is interesting that the Argentine senators are more inclined to give "much importance" to the activity of obtaining funds for their electoral constituency. For example, in his comparative study on federalism, Stepan ( , 2004b In effect, the size of the second chambers has an influence on the chances of different political parties to win a seat. If there are many districts, the likelihood that representatives of parties with a local or regional stronghold will be elected grows. On the other hand, if the Senate is elected in one national district (with proportional representation), the size of the second chamber has an influence on the effective threshold to elect representatives. 10 "If the composition of the two chambers would be identical or nearly so, then the argument against bicameralism on the grounds of waste and duplication is more compelling, and any argument about the effects of unicameralism on the effectiveness of checks and balances …. Is less so." (Carey 2003: 28) 11 In a recently published book on federalism in Latin America, one of the authors complains: "The norm 'of one person, one vote' is the most invoked and exalted norm of democratic theory, and the most violated norm of democratic practice. This is due not only to illegal manipulations by nefarious authoritarians, but to constitutional design by revered 'founding fathers' wary of potential excesses from majority rule as well." (Gibson 2004b : 15) 12 A Chilean politician recently argued: "El bicameralismo es parte del pasado, y salvo en los sistemas federales, no se justifica realmente, demora los procesos legislativos, genera un gasto innecesario y al final de cuentas debilita la fuerza del Parlamento como institución. Dos cámaras se traducen en dos opiniones, esa división obviamente debilita sus posiciones en favor del Ejecutivo. Esto es una cuestión central, si se asume realmente la necesidad de fortalecer el rol del Parlamento hay que pasar decidamente al unicameralismo." (Mártinez 2004).
topic of malapportionment. Based on one principle of political representation 13 they use the concept for a critical view on second chambers. In political science the term malapportionment refers to the seats that are allocated to districts which would not receive those extraseats if the seats would be assigned with reference to the number of voters in each district.
Malapportionment is not restricted to federal systems 14 or second chambers. Nevertheless, in general malapportionment is much higher in second chambers ).
We will not analyze the possible political effects of malapportionment. These effects will depend on the political constellation and the actor configuration. In our opinion malapportionment is part of the logic of a certain type of second chambers in bicameral systems. We take a look at the magnitude of malapportionment in Latin American bicameral systems. We expect that second chambers with a territorial basis of representation (same weight for the territorial units) will display higher indices of malapportionment than second chambers that are elected in a nationwide district.
Malapportionment is not the only factor that has an effect on the incongruent (in comparison
with the lower chamber) composition of the second chamber in bicameral systems. In addition, the electoral formula (plurality or proportional) and the district magnitude (number of representatives to be elected in one district) determine how votes are converted into seats.
Both variables have an influence on the number of parties represented in parliament as well as on the proportionality of representation. While malapportionment refers to the discrepancy between the shares of population and the shares of legislative seats held by different districts, disproportionality refers to the discrepancy between the percentage of the national votes and the percentage of seats of different parties in Parliament. We expect that second chambers with a territorial basis of representation (same weight for the territorial units), small district magnitude and majority voting systems -in general these three characteristics combine -feature less parties than the first chamber and that they are much more disproportional in their composition.
(a) Malapportionment: If we look at Latin America, malapportionment displays some special traits. First, in Latin America's history, malapportionment has a long tradition (Samuels & Snyder 2004) . Second, malapportionment is higher in Latin America than in other world regions . 15 Third, in Latin America malapportionment is not re-13 "In a malapportioned system, all citizens can enjoy a free and equal opportunity to formulate and signify their preferences, but they are denied the opportunity to have their preferences weighed equally." (Samuels & Snyder 2001: 150) . 14 Yet a regressions analysis corroborates that upper chambers in federal systems are significantly more malapportioned than second chambers in non-federal systems (Samuels & Snyder 2001: 666-667) . 15 Regression analysis of a worldwide sample showed a significant correlation between malapportionment and a regional factor "Latin America" (Samuels & Snyder 2001: 664-666 Source: Samuels & Snyder (2001: 148) .
As expected, the Senates of Argentina and Brazil -as well as the US-Senate -show high levels of malapportionment, but the same is also true for the second chambers in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. In a worldwide sample these four Latin American countries rank first as having the most malapportioned chambers . The malapportionment is minor but still high (31%) If we include the lower chambers in our analysis 17 , we can identify four groups of countries (graphic 1).
16 use a modified version of the Loosemore-Hanby index of electoral disproportionality The malapportionment index is the sum of the absolute differences between each districts' seat and population shares (in percent) divided by 2. 17 The data do not measure whether the malapportionment in the two chambers, if there is any, reinforces or cross-cuts the differences between different territorial units.
Uruguay and Paraguay demonstrate an almost perfect apportionment for both chambers. Colombia shares this characteristic for the Senate, but not for the lower chamber.
Mexico stands alone with a small distortion for the lower chamber, and a medium malapportionment (about one quarter of the seats) for the Senate.
The third group is composed of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and the Dominican Republic.
These countries share a low or moderate distortion for the lower chamber and a high malapportionment for the Senate.
Argentina possesses the highest malapportionment for the Senate (about 50% of the seats) and a moderate distortion for the lower chamber. In all the cases in which the Senate is elected by plurality vote (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Mexico prior to 1997), both the number of parties and the effective number of parties in the upper chamber are smaller than in the lower chamber (table 10; graphic 2). This effect is very strong in Brazil, Bolivia and in the Dominican Republic. However, in countries with virtually the same systems for both chambers (Chile, Uruguay) there is no significant difference or clear trend. In the Chilean case, it is the difference in the size of the chambers and the partial renewal of the Senate, which probably explain the lower number of parties represented in the Senate in three out of four elections. 20 In the cases of Paraguay and Colombia, where the Senate is elected on a national list, the number of parties represented in the Senate is higher than in the lower house. As expected, the proportionality/disproportionality indexes of Loosemore-Hanby and Rae exhibit better results when there are few parties in parliaments as in Paraguay, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic (table 11) . In general, the Gallagher index is more useful for a comparison of all the cases included in our study. With the exception of Colombia and Paraguay, disproportionality is higher in the Senate than in the lower house. If the lower house exhibits disproportional representation, normally the second chamber aggravates this effect (see graphic 3). The disproportionality of the second chamber is very high in the Dominican
Republic. It has also been high during some elections in Brazil, and in Mexico, before the electoral reform of 1997. Sources: Political database of the Americas (http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/english.html); Payne et al. (2002) and national electoral statistics.
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Six out of nine Latin American bicameral systems feature higher indices of malapportionment and disproportionality in the Senate than in the lower chamber. This result is to be expected, given that the second chambers are based on the principle that each subnational unit has the same weight, independent of the number of people living in its territory. Moreover, the senators are elected by majority vote.
We note that malapportionment is higher in Latin America than in other regions. We do not know what the political consequences are of malapportionment and disproportionality in Latin American Senates, which is not the focus of this study. Our objective in this final part
is less ambitious. We analyze the impact of the special characteristics of bicameral systems and second chambers on the political representation of women in Latin America.
Gender Quotas in Bicameral Systems
In recent times, most Latin American countries introduced special quotas to increase the participation of women in politics (IDEA 2003) . How do these mechanisms to promote a special segment of the electorate function in bicameral systems? How do they interact with different electoral systems and different degrees of malapportionment or disproportionality?
What are the repercussions for the representation of women in parliament?
The result of gender quotas depends on cultural and legal factors (Are the quotas compulsory or indicative? Are there any sanctions for non compliance?), as well as on the electoral system (Gray 2003: 55-56; Schmidt 2003: 120-123; Norris 2000 Norris , 2004 table 13 ). In the lower house the variation is between 8% and 34% of the seats, in the Senate the extreme values are 4% and 35% of the seats. In general, the representation of women is higher in the lower house, but there are two exceptions -Argentina and Brazil. Next, we will comment on the nine cases included in our study: -The case of Argentina is quite interesting. The plurality system (with minority representation) for the Senate is not conducive to the implementation of a gender quota. 26 Nevertheless, Argentina boasts one of the highest percentages of women in parliament not only in Latin America but also worldwide. One reason for this surprising result is the wording of the decree issued by president de la Rúa, which regulates the law on gender quotas. In the cases in which the mathematical application of the 30% rule of seats up for election to be filled by women result in factions less than one, the concept of minimum quantity of candidates shall be the next greater unit (Lubertino 2003: 37-38) . In consequence, if there are two positions on a list, as in the election for the Senate, at least one candidate will be a woman. This rule is very favorable for the representation of women in the Argentine Senate. The second seat of the winning list 26 According to the 1994 constitutional reform and after a long transition period, since 2001 all senators are elected by popular vote. Before the reform, they were elected by provincial Parliaments. In the Chamber of Deputies, the implementation of a gender quota started in 1993. In Chile there is no quota law, and the electoral system is the same for the Senate and the lower chamber. The small district magnitude for both chambers of congress is a disadvantage for female candidates (Gray 2003: 72-73) . The election in two member districts with closed but unblocked lists makes it difficult to implement a gender quota. In our group of countries, Chile has by far the lowest representation of women in Parliament. There is a slight difference between the lower house and the Senate. The only factor that can explain the difference in representation, is the number of districts being contested (60 in the lower chamber against 18 or 20 in the Senate). Moreover, the Senate has more prestige and is the final step in the career of many politicians.
In Colombia there is no gender quota either. As a result, the representation of women in parliament is quite low. Because of the electoral system -proportional representation by national list -and the size of the Senate (102 members) we would have expected a higher percentage of women in the second chamber.
In the Dominican Republic, there are no sanctions for non-compliance with the gender quota of 25% for the lower chamber. The Senate is elected in single-member districts by plurality vote. As result, the representation of women in the second chamber is quite low. islative districting. As a general trend, representation is much more disproportional in the upper chamber than in the lower house. Moreover, the differences in the electoral systems and district magnitudes for both chambers make it more difficult for women to win a seat in the Senate. However, as the Argentine case demonstrates the effect of gender quota ultimately depends on the specific implementation rules and execution of the quota laws. Bicameralism is certainly not to blame for the negative perceptions of democracy in Latin America, but equally, it is possible that bicameralism does not contribute to the quality of democratic representation.
